Showing posts with label experts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label experts. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 10, 2011

Scholars of humanties will save the world?

Yesterday - at least as I see, without any qualification and only intuitively - was a fine example how the psychology of the markets work. At the start almost every stock exchange plunged, almost a free fall, but they soon began to recover, most probably on the back of expectations that the FED will announce new measure to boost the sluggish US economy. The expectations ranged as far as the immediate announcement of quantitative easing adn what happened? Well, nothing. The FED reiterated that they are aware of the problems, just as they were earlier, they will keep interest rates practically at zero, just as it was for a while, they will pump back their profit into the financial system, again as it is happening even now, and of course they will consider anything that can help the economy. None of these measures helped to stop the deterioration so far, and to expect a different outcome for now would not be too logical. An none of these measures is new in any sense, not to speak of being surprising. Or did anyone honestly expected the FED to raise its rate in the face of the slump? (Just because today's hedalines speak of markets rebounding due to FED's announcement of keeping rates zero.)

Thus, the FED did not change course, while the markets were expecting something new, that could steer the world economy in another direction. The initial reaction were as one would expect: sell-off at the stock exchange. But, curiously, after some time euphoria settled and the markets rallied. Given what happened it is counterintuitive at best.. Market participants were waiting for the announcemtn of radical changes and what they receieved was the announcement of no change at all. Initially they reacted asthey should, but somehwo reconsidered their position and began to trade like the FED would have given them what they had expected. Instead of the usual market-bashing probabyl it is better to draw some conclusions.

It is not words that matter - sometimes instead of deed - but only how they are interpreted by actors on the market. Even if what they have heard was the opposite what they longed for they could still reinterpret it as if it would be the much desired news. But there is still a delicate case here: it seems words of financial institutions are more or less unintelligible for their audience and it confuses them, This time for the better - leading to positive evolution of the market -, but it can easily turn out to be the opposite. And this is the point where scholars of humanities could have a significant role in ameliorating of the workings of the economy. Who else are in a position to make a thorough textual and discoursive analysis of the words of financial institutions. Probably with a wide scale reserach project every statement and every interview of the respective central banks and their leaders should be collected and alaysed in order to determine the real meaning of words and phrases. And as personalities in the financial world change it would be a never ending story. But with the help of these scholars the markets would have a dictinoary or theasurus of the central banks enbaling them to undertsand their statements immediately. Funny, it seems the markets needs translators and they will collapse without the help of those useless humanity scholars.

Tuesday, June 8, 2010

An action plan of indecision? Updated

Hungary's new prime minister, Viktor Orbán announced yesterday his "action plan" a set of measures seen as the guidelines of the government's economic policy. The announcement followed days of insecurity caused by remarks of Fidesz and government officials on the budget deficit this year, frequently using phrases "like Greece", "default" etc. This debacle (retrospectively Fidesz politicians - speaking only from behind the defense line of anonimity - hinted to a conscious strategy, but the party has a tendency to reinterpret every failure afterwards into a plan of a mastermind, therefore it is less and less credible with time) signaled the abandonment of earlier ideas and the realignment of the possible policies.

Anyway, the prime minister delivered a very conscious speech conveying the will and energy to achieve his goals and announcing 29 measures. It had an immediate effect, it was certainly a good show of an illusionist, especially among Hungarian analysts, whose obsession with flat-tax is almost a medical case. Many of them hurried to hail the greatest structural change of the last two decades etc. And the impression in general was certainly favorable, on the surface the new policy seemed to be really well thought. Nevertheless, if scrutinized with a more critical eye - without allowing oneself to be deluded by the flat-tax - it is a surprisingly empty and astonishingly not elaborated package.

The starting point was that the government has to achieve a budget deficit as high as 3,8% of GDP this year, because the IMF and the EU (espacially the latter) would not let them to raise th target to 5-7%. However, Fidesz promised a "tax revolution" in the campaign (although it was clear that they couldn't decide whether to opt for flat-tax or a family-tax system, copying the French model) and tax cuts for enterprises. After they lost a lot of room for manoeuvre when they had to accept the lower deficit figures they still stuck to this idea and decided to find other sources of revenues to offset the income losses. The solution was imaginative but not quite convincing: the banks will pay a half of their profit to the budget in order to allow them to relax the tax burden on individuals and on other companies. Besides the 16% falt tax combined with the family tax the prime minister announced the reduction of the wage costs in the public sector, reduction of tax on companies' profit (at least for those who has a profit less than 500 million HUF) from 19% to 10%, complete freedom of distilling spirits for individuals (really!) a freeze of public services fees for the population, a ban on mortgage based fx-loans and some symbolic measures, for example reducing costs in the state sector and subventions to political parties.

However coherent it seems (and the underlying idea, even if its is horrific, is really coherent) it do not need a Nobel-prize winner to discover how scratchy it is nd how much it lacks the essence of political action: decision on some core issues and acceptance of confrontation. First of all it is still not a decision to fuse two tax systems based on very different principles, it is the opposite: an escape from decision. Considering this state of affairs it is not quite surprising that today none ion the government was capable to give information on details. There will be something with a 16% flat tax rate and with tax breaks and credits for families raising children, but to wich amount the latter will extend, what will happen with the so-called "szuperbruttó" in the present system ("super-gross calculation" an effective extension of the tax base, it taxes the ammount of the social contribution as if they would be part of the income itself) and the tax rebate. Even more serious issue is the problem of "lower wages". The present system - due to a very extended tax rebate - lays only 16% tax on a monthly income of 230000 Huf well over average and median wage in Hungary. The elimination of this part of the system was announced - in two years - which at first sight will effectively mean a tax hike for everyone with 230000 Huf or lower income. There were hints that the government will ensure that no one pay more, but there seem to be no other solution than to raise wages, but an effective 20% wage raise will not deliver one if the most sacred result of as flat tax system (at least in the eyes of its adherents): lower labour costs. (On the idea that it will create incentives to present previously untaxed incomes for the tax authority you can see my earlier post. The very theory used to support the flat tax contradicts to this idea. There is no evidence, ECE countries with flat tax are more infected with black and grey economic activity than Hungary, according to every estimate.)

Similarly vague is the idea of the reduction of costs of public services. It is even not clear whether this applies to the entire public sector, only to certain parts of it or to the state owned companies? While the prime minister mentioned 120 billion Huf as saving for this year and referred to it as 15% reduction of these costs, the only concrete measure was a 48 billion reduction at state owned companies. (But it is tricky as it is the 15% of the wage bill for the entire year while the cuts will come in the second half. The result: 25-30% for six months!) Whether public instiutions, ministries, authorities or schools, the health care sector etc. will bore the remaining 72 billion or just a part of it it is still not clear.

The freeze on public services prices was declared to be temporary, until the government negotiates something with the respective companies. However, price control will soon be reestablished. The bank tax announced without preliminary consultations. Even the method of "liberating" spirit distillation is not clear., it is at the moment not more then a wish list without calculations. And it is based on a very tight calculation, without any reserves and always counting on the most optimistic scenario. If the bank tax falls of or fails to deliver the necessary amount, if growth will remain sluggish the deficit will soar up and austerity will settle to other sectors. Moreover, even the real extent of tax cuts is not clear, because no one knows the amount of family tax breaks and rebate and the future of the present tax rebates. Therefore no realistic calculation of the effect of the package on the budget is possible. (And no structural reforms - some percentage points relaxation in an already almost flat-tax system is far from being one, across the board cuts in the public sector can also be seen hardly as such,Gyurcsány would have been ridiculed by the same "analysts" with a similar action plan who are now praising Orbán.) We have seen the sorcerer, the white rabbit was fat and juicy but it evaporated in a day....

However, the direction is clear: redistribution of wealth from the lower strata to the rich (the very rich) and from the poorest regions to the richest quarters of Budapest. It's negative effect on local economies is predictable as purchasing power will dissipate (while the positive effects of creating jobs is doubtful at best, the recovery could easily turn out to be fragile with the austerity programs of EU governments, the most far-sighted ideas of the Fidesz program were postponed - investment into energy efficiency, for example - or even thrown off etc.) and already huge differences in the country will grow. Well, the show was excellent, but the road is still covered by thick fog.

Update: So, we have a plan with the aim to keep under control the budget deficit and boost competitiveness through lower labour costs. But the secretary of state in the ministry of national economy responsible for tax issues announced today that the "szuperbruttó" will be eliminated and no one will be worse off in the new system (i.e. no one will have lower net income) than in the old one. No details, of course.

But even in this very basic and vague form the plan seems to be way off the announced aims. If the government will pressure companies to raise wages it will negatively affect labour costs without an equivalent raise in productivity. At the moment the average wage of 56500 physical workers in the agriculture is 109746 HUF. They would need a 12,2% higher wage in order to have the same level of net wage. But it would mean an additional 3,5% in higher social contributions as well. Similarly, the (non-existent) average industrial worker (441900 people) will need a 7% rise in wages what would mean an additional 2% in social contributions. The 195900 workers in the commercial sector will need a 10,7% higher salary, an additional 2,9% burden in social contribution. Moreover, the state employs hundreds of thousands of public sector workers and teachers, nurses etc. who also will have to enjoy the benefit of higher salaries in order to offset negative effects - if the secretary of state mentioned above told the truth. 3,5% raise for average employees in the health care sector (148300 people), 13% for physical workers in the same sector (90200 people), 10% for physical workers in the educational sector etc. Certainly more than 30 billion HUF just in order to compensate them real wages still declining. It is still not a well thought plan, just improvisation.

Friday, July 3, 2009

The Markets, oh the Markets!

Last week the Hungarian governemnt achieved a great "victory", the parliament passed a bill on the taxes and tax system in next year, modifying the structure of taxes, with cuts in the personal income taxes and the social security contributions and hikes in VAT, introducing a new property tax etc. It laid the foundations of the next budget and it made the ministers quite proud of their production. Moreover, the government was 75 days old and it gave an opportunity for the prime minister and the finance minister to give interviews on the progress made by this new, brave body fighting the crisis so effectively. (One should ask, why is a prime minister, who is admittedly not seeking political career after his term will expire, so keen on making pr, but I really don't know. Maybe he is afraid of the possibility that his parliamentary majority will collapse, but I would doubt that it is the proper way to fight it. And PR-interviews - especially in the Hungarian case, where the "questions", due to the tragic quality of journalists and journalism, seem as if they would have been prepared by the Prime Minister's press secretary - are not only boring, but unconvincing, without any originality.)

Anyway, the finance minister and his boss pointed out that their success is signalled by the markets as well. The strengthening of the forint is a sign of the returning trust. I understand, that sometimes those who are in political positions, feel the necessity (and sometimes they are even compelled) to make stupid statements, in order to gain popularity, portray themselves as capable individuals etc. But this government is supposedly an expert one, the finance minister arrived from Deloitte. I don't really think that he has no idea of the current situation: there is no credible sign of an individual assessing of the forint and its movements against the dollar and euro were and are driven by fears regarding the state of affairs in other countries (most notably in the USA and in the eurozone) and by mere speculation, the so-called carry-trade. Or, with other words: the current movements are the result of a very high interest rate of the Hungarian National Bank and the willingnes of the so-called investors to see green shoots everywhere. Nothing specifically Hungarian, as everyone can see, who compares the movements of the currencies from Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the first one and the latter being considered as more stable economies than Hungary.

But the really frightening probability is, that the minister can be convinced of his truth. Not necessarily because in this case he and his government tries to please actors, who do not really care about its activity, but because sometimes it shows a quite simplistic obsession with the idea of the efficient markets. Well, it is a viable econimic theory, that was capable to make tolerable predictions for decades, but in the light of the recent events even those, who were not aware of its problems are ready to admit that at least some refining would be needed. And as a perspective of the human society, it is rather frightening, as it tries to reduce its complexity in one single indicator: market price.

Moreover, as in the last few weeks I had an opportunity to glance at many products (analyses etc.) from market actors (due to some kind people dealing with economics or the economy, with quite different views) and as a result I'm increasingly convinced that those are less complex than it would be necessary in times of economic turbulances. Not that they would be useless, but they use only a limited range of indicators and data and sometimes too obsessed with the mathematical models, instead of leaving some room for the good old intutition. Although predictions based on the mathematics and market conventions turned out be very risky nowadays.

But this is not the only problem with the Hungarian government's actions. As they are keen to please "markets" and consider as the sign of the success of this efforts the strengtheing of the forint, they are slowly giving up the advantages brought by the rapid depreciation of the national currency and its relative stability in the last two months. The competivity (what they are seeking with tax cuts in a dire budgetary situation, therefore compensating it with budget cuts, equally hurting consumption as the tax cuts are inspiring it) gained suddenly and unintentionally (the eternal comparison, Slovakia was behind Hungary in terms of labor costs at the beginning of the year, although the "experts", among them the minister himself, always complained that Hungary lost its competivity regarding cheap labor to Slovakia, and it was a reason behind tax cuts and social spending cut proposals) are now trickling away. Even though there is some reason behind it - reducing the debt burden of those, who are indebted in foreign currency -, it is at the same time simply the mirror image of the much despised politics of pleasing inactive voters with financial transfers through the social security system. It is very much an attempt to satisfy middle-class rent-seeking, placing the complete burden of adjustment on the shoulders of those, who are living from sthe social security systems. and even though there are many inactive people, who would be capable to work, the lion's share of this group is composed by pensioners and by those, whoe are really living on a subsistance level, without any hope for a decent work. This politics is not seeking the just distribution of the burdens of the crisis, it tries to privilege a group, that bear some responsibility for the situation of the country, as they were ready to take a huge debt burden, many times with repayment rates higher than the half of their otherwise not too large income. And as it is clearly hurting the long term perspectives of the country (Hungary abandoned even the moderate room it acquired through this strengthening of the forint in terms of monetary policy, as the HNB is focusing on the debt level and not on the exchange rate yielding advantages, therefore it is not ready to lower interest rates), either as an economy, or as a society, it is equally problematic, as the rent-seeking of the inactive groups.

The other privileged group will be the entrepreneurs. The tax cuts are aimed to ensure they lasting competivity through making labor cheaper. Although personally I don't think that eternally lowering labor costs through abandoning every public service is a viable strategy of growing welfare and standards of living, this time I would only point out that - as I argued some posts earlier - without a growth of the capital in the economy it is clearly a hidden state subsidy for non-competitive companies (the state subsidizing even negative marginal products of the newly employed labor with renouncing some state incomes), and as usual in those cases it will probably bring only more private profit from public money. It is possible, that in the long run it will really bring some raise in employment rates, but I'm doubtful regarding its effectivity, at least its effectivity imagined by the minister. But it is another story...

(Oh, and meanhwile flagellant exceptionalism surfaced in Romania. A well known blogger counted 13 factors of Romania being affacted worst by the crisis. :) Maybe my next post will cover this funny topic.)

Sunday, May 31, 2009

Reminiscences of Ancient Syria? - turncoat economics

It is always flattering when economists regularly expressing their views publicly and supposedly with high authority support one's ideas, even if only unconsciously as they very probably never ever learnt of those. Therefore it is highly understandable if I was very proud of my smart ideas hearing that such an excellent economist as László Csaba (not to be confused with Csaba László, former minister of finance), professor at the Central European University and someone who is not only regularly sought by the media as expert but who also accepts this role and attends different TV and radio shows and gives interviews almost every week, echoed some of my thoughts. The opportunity was provided by the presentation of his new book(s?)"Crisis in Economics?" and in this task he was sided by another renowned expert, Péter Ákos Bod, former chairman of the Hungarian National Bank.

According to Csaba's opinion the crisis brought with it a wave of self-fulfilling pessimism and the real task would be to fight these jinxs as everyone knows that the crisis will have an end. Regarding the fate of economics as a science he didn't dare to make a judgement whether it is in crisis or not, but listed the problems and challenges economists are obliged to encounter. The presumption of absolute rationalism of actors, the capability of the markets for self-correction and the position of the economists as omniscient technicians of the societey, so willingly embraced by many, will certainly be doubted. He can even imagine that the present crisis will be a starting point for a paradigm shift as well. He denied that the road of the ECE countries towards convergence would be identical differing only in the starting points and maybe in their speed. In these assumptions and presumptions he was supported by Mr. Bod.


I won't say that such a set of ideas could not be consistent. But recalling Mr. Csaba's public performance from the last few monthes this book is a complete U-turn. (Just a short collection from the first few pages of a googled list, unfortunately in Hungarian.) He was convinced even in this February that the crisis is not an economic one, rather a financial, he prophesized that there won't be significant contraction. Moreover, he belonged (and still belongs) to the group of economists self-puffedly sitting in a studio and expressing their opinions peremptorily, never expressing reservations regarding its validity, never allowing that other views could have at least some minor relevance. As for the content of those views and proposals, Mr. Csaba never ever expressed something different from mainstream neoliberal ideas, he was always a champion of a smaller state sector, lower taxes and lower social spendings and among his arguments, clearly thought to be irresistible, always hinted to the example of states like Slovakia or Romania. (At least for me it is quite different from the idea of every ECE country having its own path towards convergence, even though in this case Mr. Csaba only wanted to fend off the opinion that the present crisis started outside Hungary and not inside.) To sum up: Mr. Csaba was not only always convinced of his own superiority as an expert, but he havn't got the slightes doubt regarding the mainstream model of economic policy and models and he proved to so overconfident that he dismised the idea of a world economic crisis even three and a half months ago, and attributed the situation in Hungary solely to the faults of its governments.

Everyone has the right to change his opinion. But it would be more credible if he would have been able to spell out some words expressing his sorry over his failure as economist in the recent past, describing clearly the points he reconsidered and not posing continously as the greatest ever Hungarian economists. It would have been made the book even more credible, as one can hardly believe that a serious work (not simply seeking easy publicity and money with a trendy topic) on such an important and complex topic could have been finished in three months (as Mr. Csaba held the opposite view that time) with all the necessary thorough editorial work as well.

I wouldn't waste any words of substance on Mr. Bod whose only considerable contribution to economics was his proverbial and long remered role played at negotiations with taxi drivers blocading the country in 1990, when he was more eager to satisfy his "biological necessities" than to bring the negotiations to a reassuring end, and who is a well-embededd member of the chorus of economists suddenly discovering themselves as non-neoliberals and meanwhile promoting the idea of a low tax, low redistribution, small-state economic model.

Update, 5. 8. 2009.: I have to admit, that I was not entirely fair with Mr. Csaba, but I was only following his public appearances and presumed that he is formulating the same opinion in his scientific texts as well. Now it turned out that he called for attention to the so called new populisms in the flat-tax economies (among them Slovakia), a phenomenon he characterized the politicians willingness to please the entrepreneurs with everything (low taxes, deregulation etc.) and making a fetish from the growth in a paper presented at a conference in March 2008. But as soon as he appeared in a radio or TV studio (and he made it fairly often, in almost every second week) he suddenly forgot about his scientific results and was like a robot, always repeting that Hungary has to cut taxes, spending as Slovakia and our regional competitors made earlier. So, the conclusion: he is not necessarily silly, he is simply mean and unprincipled, in his role as public commentator simply following political aims.

Saturday, May 16, 2009

Never say reform again? - Despised words and obvious bias

The release of the GDP data gave an opportunity to quickly assess the situation in ECE and Reuters did it with an article yesterday. Although the piece is not unbalanced, it has some peculiarties in it, showing incoherence in the picture and the argumentation. (Although it is rather a report then a text expressing opinion, the concluding remarks disguised as a citation from Katinka Barzych, clearly shows the preferences of the authors, more reform is needed in ECE.) Especially the part about the two types of ECE economies is lacking any real factual basis and can only be interpreted as a sign of an effort of those analysts who visibly failed as experts, to uphold their views and their personal legitimacy. After yesterday's data it is really questionable to make a significant difference between so called reform countries - Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia - and "reform laggards" like Hungary or Bulgaria (!). Especially in the case of the latter, where not only a budget surplus was achieved - that means having had more restricted public finances as in any of the above mentioned reformers, but that was also praised as a booming and investment and business friendly country. Other telling fact is the lack of Romania from the classification, wich was again pointed out as a model for the reform laggard(s)... Maybe it would have been too much even for our experts to qualify Romania as having brighter outlook after the country registerd the largest contraction outside the Baltics?

Even more contradictory is the classification of the Baltics. For years those countries were considered to be among the most reform oriented, most business friendly ones with flat-tax systems and budget surpluses, low redistribution rates and social expenditures,* while Hungary as reform laggard - implicitly even in the above mentioned article - was criticized because of its "high" social spending. The fate of the Baltics, simply dosn't fit into the framework of reform countries having a good chance to emerge early from the crisis, and I'm convinced that it completely undermines the whole argumentation. Moreover the "experts" expressed their views that countries relying on strong export oriented industrial sectors will have an earlier recovery, due to growing demands in their export markets as the recession fades. But the reform laggard Hungary has one of the strongest export oriented industrial sector that in itself performed quite well even under the strains of the restrictive fiscal policy of the recent years, with huge growth rates in production and export as well. Why do these so-called economists think that Hungary's export oriented companies wouldn't be able to use the growing demand in order to expand their production, especially as the country's public finances are in a significantly better shape then two years ago? And why do they think that the Slovak industry relying heavily not on a differentiated range of products but on three car producing companies will experience a growth similar to the one seen in the last years? Can they ensure that the demand for cars will remain the same? Can they predict that consumers will have the same amount of money to spend and will look after the same goods at the same amount? I would call it voodoo economics rather than expertise... Or, even worth the complete incapability to pose the right questions.

The similar effects of the crisis in ECE and the contraction far worse then expected in countries earlier expected to fare better than "reform laggards" can be a sign - besides showing those experts in their completely miserable condition - that the very model of growth implemented in these countries after the change of regime reached its limits, especially as the integration of the financial markets deprived the fiscal policy from its means to controll and influence the outside flow of capital.

Despite the possible objections and the important questions looming over ECE even if "experts" do not dare to ask after them, they sole advice is to continue reforms. Although the crisis and the events in the Baltics even before, revealed that the economic model so wholeheartedly advocated was not capabale to fulfil any of its promises - sustained and fast growth, growing incomes at the individual level, fast real convergence to Europe - they are sticking to these ideas. Peculiar. And not only peculiar. Sometimes it is complete blindness. Nigel Sharing expressed his opinion that: "“The Baltics have proven that they are flexible enough to carry out these reforms and wage cuts. The only danger is that public pressure could grow due to the rounds of budget cuts.” But it s a contradictio in adjecto. If the Baltics already prooved its flexibility then no danger of the abovementioned kind should exist. If such danger exists then the Baltics has not proven anything of its flexibility. Moreover, the political developments - recently the Estonian coalition practically collapsed, the rightist parties look after new possible combinatitons, excluding social democrats - shows that the pressure is growing. Why not, one should ask? It is not only the course of events to be expected in an economic crisis, but at the same time reveals another important part of the problem. The much advocated model ensured fast growth - at least seemingly and certainly only temporarily - but at the cost of social cohesion, with growing inequalities. Why shouldn't societies opt for a moderate growth - especally as the sustainabilty of the 6-7-8-9% rates in the medium term are highly questionable, at least after the recent crisis' experiences - instead of a faster one menaing only real convergence to Europe only for the highest 10% or 20% of the respective societies. Sometimes there is a reason behind the development that the phrase reform is more and more despised in some ECE countries...

Oh, and the Slovak press was once again true to its traditions. The SME summarized the Reuters article with the following title
"Reuters: Slovaks made refomrs, Hungarians didn't. We can see the result" Yes, we can see. Slovakia is falling from a higher cliff into a deeper canyon?

*A recent rankings of competitivity of individual economies, based on the data from 2008 (!) provided by the IMD Business School ranked the Baltics still higher than the other ECE countries, despite a huge loss of position compared to the previous year....

Friday, May 15, 2009

Doomsday or the truth revealed? - Q1 GDP data released...

It is almost official - Slovakia is always keen on overtaking Hungary either towards heaven or hell. The official (although preliminary) data on the economic growth in the countries of Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Romania is out. Every one of them was much better then the landlside experienced in the Baltics ranging from a 12,/% to a 18% year-on-year, but neither was very rosy. The Hungarian one 5,8% seasonally adjusted is slightly better then it was expected especially as the range of predictions/forcasts (or rather guesses, sometimes even bets) was between 5,5% and 10%(!). The other three publications were equally surpirsing, Slovakia with 5,4%,* Czech Republic 3,8% and Romania 6,4%. In these cases the data was far worse than it was expected, the contraction being twice or three times faster than predictions/forecasts (or rather guesses, sometimes even bets).

The conclusions? The situation is not rosy (ok, it is dire) but ECE is more homogenous than the "analyts' and "economists" were ready to admit. The predicted differences are less pronounced in terms of GDP contraction and if one compares the decline of the GDP with the year on year datas from the 4th quarter of 2008, then it is quite clear that Hungary, the economy of which fared worse in 2008, performed relatively better, not that it has any real significance among the present circumstances. The important issue is that those countries that were presumed to be more resilient either because being in the Eurozone and/or having a supposedly better tax system making them more competitive in the eyes of so-called analysts and economists underperfomed their forecasts. Those factors that were considered to influence the economic processes were seemingly not really importante in determining the economic contraction's pace. One can even dare to assume that they played no role in it. The broader framework of the world economy determines the fate of ECE not individual country's responses.

Moreover it is another question mark regarding the expertise of the analysts, who have a great influence on the image on the individual countries - conferring and/or conveying the opinion and judgment of the "markets" about those economies, and that way sometimes even deciding whether those will be financed or not - sticked to ideas clearly not really having roots in the present reality, namely that every country is an individual case and the main reason behind the depth of the crisis is the respective economic policy.

Otherwise the competiton is not finished. Slovakia is on the heels of Hungary and Romania is already leading the pack. Beware Hungarians...!!!

*Update: according to figures at the website of the Slovak Statistical Office the seasonally adjusted data for Slovakia was in fact 6% decline, that means even higher than the respective Hungarian one.

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

Facts and figures - where to find the "reality"?

In an earlier - long, boring, not well argumented etc., as you wish - post I tried to outline the very peculiar concept of time and space prevalent in ECE in the public sphere, primarily among so-called analysts and economists. The recent events in Hungray, primarily the installment of the new government and the prime minister's presentation of his program revealed an interesting epistemological problem, quite connected to the crisis as well, that of the facts. What are considered to be facts nowadays here, who produces facts, why are facts accepted as "truth" and sometimes why are they rejected? I have no ready answers for the questions described above, I can only register the problem itself and to make some hypothesis, viable ones, I hope, regarding its foundations and origins.

Two minor details, not really taken seriously by the public, can shed some light on the problem and its context. The prime minister designate, Gordon Bajnai was supposed to work hard on his evaluation of the economic situation and the crisis since he was proposed to be the candidate for this post at the beginning of April, but promised to present his ideas and proposals only at April 18. At the same day he held an international press conference, where he showed a presentation. (Bajnai is very convincing at presenatations, this dominant form of selling one's ideas today, once I saw him in Brussels as he was putting forward Hungar's claim for the European Science and Technology Agency's seat, and two gentlemen in front of me, I would say they were German, concluded that he was very good and clear, although for someone from the academics - where I'm supposed to belong, even if I feel sometimes that it is a self delusion and I'm only clinging to my false ideas and I'm not ready to accept my failure - the whole thing was a series of banalities, but I'm sure that it is an inevitable characteristic of the genre.) This presentation was marketing some old ideas on the factors of the crisis, outside and inherent ones, specificlly Hungarian and international and the proposed solutions - not completely without contradictions in itself - were also well known. But the communication team made a mistake, as they mada downloadable a form of the presentation that consisted some technical data regarding the author of it and the date of the last modification. The material was prepared by the intrnationl company McKinsey and last modified at April 3.

One can conclude that the supposed hard work was only a deception and Bajnai, while seemingly negotiating with politicians, parties etc. knew from the beginning that he won't modify his views. He won't acept that facts and argumentations based on this fats provided for him by others can be relvant, important or "true". (Anything this last concept covers.) He made a choice earlier and was not ready and openminded to accept others point of view or at least to ponder it. Even more interesting is the fact, that his own, unwavering ideas were not based on the data and results of their evaluation provided by the state administration (a series of institutions from the Ministry of Financ to the Statistial Office) but on concepts of an international company. One could say that he accepted the opinion of the so called markets and analysts without any reservation, even though those guys are using only a limited set of data, some figures considered to be very important and they try to deduce from those every other information on the respective economy.

Quite revealing in this sense is the data on the sovereign debt in the presentation itself. Many so-called analysts, among them the new finance minister of Hungary, are convinced that the country is on its path towards sovereign default, baceuse the debt ratio to GDP has soared in last year and there is no way to hamper the process without harsh spending cuts. (I discussed this issue in an earlier post on the S&P evaluation of the problem.) The presentation was in line with this assumption, although two fellows from the National Agnecy for Sovereign Debt published a well argumented article, in wich the porved that this assumption is false. (They reasoning was similar to what I oulined in the above mentioned earlir post.) What is really striking that the prime minister rejects the opinion of the state authorities, that have more data and probably more epxertise on the issue than so-called analysts and accepts the views of the latter. Why don't disolve this costly state institution if some self-appointed guys know it better? It would be also beneficial in financial terms.

In the light of this events it is easier to understand why are the majority of the so-called analysts are convinced that the costs of the state administration can be reduced significantly. They so it as completely useless, the existence of which is only a tradition and age old custom, something that can be substituted by market institutions. Well, maybe there is some hope. As you can see from the next post, even the most hawkish guys from the so-calld markets could soon realize that it is always easier to sell ideas on cuts and solutions without responsibility, and the limits could be immediately obviuos from another perpsective. But it is still a long way to go until facts won't be only facts if they are provided and pondered by the so-called market institutions with the most narrow perspective and having only mediocre expertise.

Monday, March 30, 2009

Paradoxes of downgrading and simple accounting

One of the worst, most feared moments of the crisis for many ECE countries is the event of downgrading by a credit rating agency. It is usually accompanied by a sudden fall of the respective currency on the market (sometimes as a lasting effect, sometimes followed by a recovery soon), by the growing spreads of government bonds and by a wavering credibility in the country's public finances etc. Although it is far from being a case of normality, such downgradings and its opposites, upgradings occur regularly. The reactions, usually in line with the agnecy's direction, express the faith of the market actors in those institutions, the fact that they accept: the agency is capable to analyze possible outcomes of the present situation with mathematical models and judge whether a country among fixed circumstances can repay its debt or not. (In case of some factors they should rely on hypothesis or forecasts.)

The crisis shattered the credibility of such agencies as their mathmatical models readily accepted the fact that subprime mortgages can be "repacked" into extraordinarily secure assets and from the perspective of the crisis it was clearly not the case. However, this fact seemingly didn't affect their credibility as evaluators of sovereign debts (Paradox 1). (Who knows why? Incompetence remains incompetence even if it is used to assess a different type of loans and bonds...) But one can assume that rating agencies drew the consequences and they logical reaction is to be more cautious, that means to make downgradings easier and earlier. Not that in case of a crisis, when forecasts have to be revised in every month or week caution wouldn't be advisable, but acting instinctively is not in line with the perceived scientifically based approach. (Paradox 2) Anyway, the agencies are desperate not to make the same mistake, and in the future assess risks more precisely, what also means to be able to forecast problems (in case of countries: sovereign default) earlier. Downgrading is a sign of taking into account risks and warning the markets and the respective states. And if the worst happens notwithstanding the early notice, the credit rating agency can only gain in credibility and standing.

It is cerainly a sound approach in normal times, especially as markets can calm down after a downgrading, government should have time to prepare the necessary action. But there is a not easily dismissable possibility that in times of crisis the more severe judgment can turn out to be a self fulfilling prophecy in a way not strengthening, but weakening the much desired trust. The external factors, quite independently from the government action, can deteriorate in a very short time span once again forcing the agencies to downgrade a country's debt and leaving no time even to prepare the necessary measures as a reaction to the earlier one and portraying even the most able government as inapt. The deathly circle of downgrading and raising bond sperads leading to downgrading again and raising the bond spreads again can emerge too easily. As there is no way to know how a very alarmed and uncertain market will react, it is not easy to know when will this prophecy fulfill itself at the very moment of the downgrading. But if it would happen it won't be a sign of the wisdom and professional capability, quite the contrary. In this case, as it would be very similar to those derivatives from sub-prime mortgages, it would be inevitable to think that they once again missed their point, and miscalculated themselves. (Paradox 3)

But beyond some intriguing, rather theoretical considerations, sometimes the practical capacities of such institutions seems to be problematic as well. Today Standards and Poor downgraded Hungary's long term sovereign debt and issued a statement in which they calculated that the present 72-73% debt in ratio of GDP will reach a 82% level next year, after an estimated 6% contraction followed by a 1% in 2010 and after the country will be compelled to ask more loans from IMF. This is more or less in line with the ideas of "experts", but nothing else than a simple miscalulation, presuming that the present-day gross debt will eventually turn out to be a net one. But it is far from being certain, moreover, up to this point it didn't happened. The problem with this calculation - as the deputy general director of Hungary's national agency for sovereign debt explained in an interview last week - that although Hungary has drawn a substantial part of its IMF loan last year, it is now either a deposit in the Hungarian National Bank, or was lent to commercial banks with market conditions. In case of the latter there is a fair chance that it will be returned in time with due interests. The former either will be used to buy back outstanding state bonds or pay for bonds in due time, therefore not piling up additional sovereign debt, or simply paid back to the IMF without being used. As long as this is a reserve and not paid for running state costs or used up as a resource for pensions or similar expenses there is no reason to assume that it will raise the level of sovereign debt. But even if it would be the case the 82% ratio is highly unrealistic. The present debt is calculated by S&P as 73% of the GDP, and they estimate a 6% decline for this year and a 1% for the next. Together we can assume that they calculate the GDP level in 2010 as the 93% of 2008. Accordingly today's debt ratio would be compared with this lower level, yielding a 77,4% result as the level of sovereign debt. Even if they were not presuming any governemnt measure to control this years deficit (although it is not the case) 82% seems to be a bit exagerrated. But the problem is not this calculation, but the fact that the "experts" at S&P, although certainly very smart at making mathematical models, are not capable to make a simple accounting work. Well, I know that it is tought at another department...

Update: Two feloows from the National Agency for State Debt published today an analysis refuting the prevailing perception of the inevitable sovereign default, pointing out the huge mistake regarding the IMF loan. Unfortunately it is in Hungarian.

The black hole called Hungary - Notes on exceptionalism VI.

After more than a week of frantic selectionary work (vetting a lá Hongrois) a new candidate for the position of the prime minister emerged. The twists and turns of last week were certainly fascinating for observers and outsiders and I wouldn't even astonished to attend once a theater play or a movie using the story as a basis. (Conmedy or tragedy, I don't really know.) But as the sun rose to it's dull and boring daily road to be accomplished, the scene was taken over by our "experts" and "analysts" conveying the judgement of the markets on the events. Many of them was eagerly and happily sharing with us their wisdom and it is conceivable that they hadn't omitted the effect of the recent political events on the exchange rate of the forint. And once again their majority saw clear and undoubtable signs of a strong causal realtionship. The fall of the forint againts euro at dawn was a message, expressing negative expectations and so on. And once again the story was completely dead half an hour later. The zloty, tha Czech koruna similarly fell even at dawn.

Not only the incompetence of these guys, perceivedly having the necessary qualifications for and being entitled to make more money with the use of that of others is a sad picture but their whole construction of the world so nicely expressed by these small episodes. Even though the resignation of a prime minister, the deterioration of the process of finding a new candidate to a farce and a stalemate at the weekend, when the early elections seemed inevitable was not able to influence the markets, they are sticking to the idea that Hungary has its own significance. As the once land of promise in ECE and now the sick man of the region, the adhorring example to where incompetence could lead. Either as the best or as the worst in the region, but Hungary stands out. They are clearly not disturbed by the fact that this is not the case. Their beloved and adored markets are making not much difference and as long as the most important concern on those markets is whether to buy US bonds or not, it will remain so.

Thursday, March 26, 2009

Chaos unleashed – Hungary in the Maelstrom

Four days after the announcement from premier Gyurcsány about his willingness to abdicate, the following events were very much in line with the predictable. The socialists are almost unanimously denounced as the roots of all evil; the first contemptous articles full of rage and triumphalism were published; the media is dominated by the expectations of the business elites regarding a prime minister convenient for their own interests, of course portrayed as the absolute public good; the president of the republic urged early elections; the socialists are in disarray, mainly only sticking to their positions and not to values or an ideology and we still don't know whether at least a new government will be installed or the dissolution of the parliament is inevitable. (Well, otherwise, everyday life seems not to be affected very much by the events. Hungary is a pessimistic country where passions are boiling under the surface but not outbursting at the moment.)

Conventional wisdom says that the fate of the Hungarian government was sealed by the crisis and the collapse was inevitable. Although there are many elements of the truth in this assumption I tend to disagree with its entirety. Not in the sense that the crisis wouldn't have had an impact on the events, quite the contrary. The decisive moment was the choice of the prime minister in the fall of last year to make an attempt to recover his credibility with effective handling of the crisis and at the same time snooker his opponent, Orbán, with the help of diverse social organization, from whom he hoped for support. He hoped for a reframing of the political discourse and legitimize not only his politics but the reform attempts as well. But the last decision, regarding Orbán, meant that instead of putting forward the structural problems of the world economy in the form of discussing the roots and possible outcomes of the crisis, the responsibility for the events etc. he returned to the earlier problems of Hungary and Hungary's economy, regardless any possible change in the external circumstances, because his would be allies were only interested in those problems. As a consequence, the discourse remained narrowly focused on Hungary as if it would be a sole entity, independent from the world economy, therefore capable to resolve its problems alone. Thus the presumption that the earlier economic policy was wrong and a decisive factor of the crisis, became an implicit axiom of every approach to the problem, that way not strengthening, but weakening the governments credibility, quite the contrary effect Gyurcsány wished for. Moreover the handling of the crisis became entangled with the problem of reforms. Those are not really popular and I suppose not only because of their effects on individual income and wealth. Similarly important is the fact that the vison and ideology behind them is very vague and clearly favoring only a minority of the society. Therefore without a profound debate, it is unrealistic to expect acceptance from those, who would be disadvantaged.

Maybe it is worth to make a short excursus regarding this problems, as it could highlight a very peculiar specificity of the current proposals in Hungary: almost every one of them is aimed to solve a particular problem in the system with a general transformation. For example the most popular version of a pensions reform among „experts” is the cutting of the present pensions with 8-10% and their freezing in real terms. Thus today's standard of living would be offered for today's pensioners forever in order to save money, while at the same time almost every one emphasizes that those are the burden on the system who get early pensions as handicapped with fraud. (The estimated number is well over 400-500000!) Another example is the general property tax, 0,5-1% of the value of the real estate according to the proposals. As the value of real estate expressed as multiple of personal income is very high, it could lead to a new burden not counterbalanced with the proposed tax cuts and especially in the case of pensioners and those with a minimal wage, whose income is tax free at the moment. Therfore they won't receive any easing, only a new tax, that easily could compel them to sell their houses. The main argument supporting this proposal is once again the fact, that many entrepreneurs exist, who pay taxes and excises after a minimal wage, while having a large and luxurious house. But once again instead of making a correction in order to eliminate the specific problems, the proposals are designed to achieve a profound transformation.* Returning to the problem of the crisis and reforms the above examples show one more important characteristic of the respective plans: those usually tend to redistribute the burden favoring the upper income categories and hitting the lower ones significantly and it is comprehensibly not really popular.

Once again putting forward reforms as the way of handling the crisis was clearly a mistake, as it enraged significant groups of the society and the result was indecision and ineptitude. Moreover, as Gyurcsány was hoping for support from those who's plans he was not able to implement, he was at the same time not in a position to attack them and spark a debate in which the responsibility of the rich for the future of Hungary would have been the most important topic. As a consequence came a deadlock, and Gyurcsány lost the remnants of his credibility.

One can argue that it was the only way, not only because those reforms are necessary (something I would like to discuss, even though not in extenso, later), but because the country is depending on the benevolence of the markets and they expect such moves in order to lower the country's risk assessment. I won't be that convinced, especially as the two problems, crisis and reform can be detached from each other. The crisis is a matter of how to pay back your outrunning debt at the moment (the real economy deopends on the recovery of the export markets, first of all Germany) and nobody (especially not the markets) expects the crisis lasting forever or for too long. (The former assumption is almost certainly true, the latter one is more dubious, but we can see every day how markets believe in the easy remedy in the form of some very smart and sophisticated action plan restoring the assets to their true value and they are waiting its arrival in any moment.) Therefore the foremost problem is not how to pay back your outrunning debt ten years later, when according to the expectations everything will be in order again (especially as nobody knows how much it will be, and with what conditions) and not how to pay it back at the moment when Hungary has a short-term credit from IMF, EU, World Bank, but how to pay it back at the very moment without accumulating a huge burden of new debts. If one simplify this problem it is quite clear: the government has to control the budget deficit in accordance with its most important creditors conditions (what are softening from day to day) and with the need to make some kind of stimulus as well. This is a hard task but not necessarily means measures aimed at long term objectives, rather ones that are effective but clearly only temporary. Like cutting the working week with one day in the public service, suspending, but not erasing the so called 13th month pension etc. I would suppose that the temporariness of the measures would make it easier to accept them, the measures itself would portray the government as capable to act decisively, while not necessarily meaning the renunciation on structural changes after the crisis is over.

On the other hand I would suppose that such an approach to the problem would be even advantageous for the quality of the structural changes as well. The most important problem with the present proposals is that those were developed in a completely different environment, when it was easy to assume that the model implemented in many ECE countries as an effective means of attracting FDI brings a fast real convergence and is capable to restrain the accumulation of imbalances. But with the crisis (and with the developments in the Baltics, even before the crisis hit those states) it is hard not to place a question mark after this presumption. Thus it would be deadly important to put two questions not independent from each other: how far are the earlier models valid (especially in ECE) and how will be the world economy emerging from the purgatory of the global crisis? As far as these are not answered convincingly no reform proposal (except some vague and very universal assumptions,like the need of balanced budget etc.) can be treated as well founded because those clearly wouldn't be based on the realities. (It does not necessarily mean that no reform proposal would turn out to be effective and succesful, but it would be rather the result of luck and not of the quality of them.)

If the latter approach would have been prevailed it would have had political advantages as well. Gyurcsány would have had an opportunity to take stance against the unpopular reform proposals arguing that the country needs a solid plan and not one based on dubious premises, to make populist attacks on the „capitalists” or the „bankers” and „brokers” as responsible for the crisis, seeking their own personal advantage even in these dire hours and therefore lifting some of the burden on him and maybe generate a popular rage against them, giving him real political weight after months of minority government when he was treated as doomed to lose his position sooner or later. Maybe he even would have been capable to implement some measures for the handling of the crisis that would have distributed the sacrifices a bit more evenly (for example with a one time levy on large properties, a nice, one time income for a shattered budget), thus making it easier for the majority of the population to accept the inevitable. It would have meant the renunciation on the snookering of his opponent, but maybe it would have been a real chance to reframe the discourse and transform the political situation in order to emerge with more popular support even for well thought changes. It was not a very probable outcome, but the possibility certainly existed. With the abdication he not only accepted his failure, but once again returned to his earlier strategy, waging war as the champion of reforms and modernity and almost certainly lost the real opportunity forever.

*(I know that there are many other supportive arguments for pension and tax reform. But as these reasons surface the most often, I only would like to highlight the twist in this approach, because it is a general problem regarding the different plans.)

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

Business as usual and the distortion of time

Three days has passed since the informal EU summit at Sunday, an event in a series of meetings aiming to find solutions for the effects of the crisis. ECE is "dead again" or more precisely its leaders once again proved that they are not aware of the similarities in the region (or prefer to emphasize the differences) and ready to seek shelter at the expense of the others. (Irony was not missing once again, at least retrospectively. The Estonian premier was egaer to point out in how good conditions his country is, while two days later the Statistiocal Office published an almost 27% year on year drop of the industrial output.) Surprisingly the German chancellor shared their view as well, dismissing any idea of a common rescue package.

Although there were voices disappointed with the outcome of the summit, the news in Hungary soon became a means of hammering the prime minister, as it was considered as a heavy defeat for him, who earlier championed the idea of a 180 billion euro aid action before the meeting. As a result Hungary again was portrayed as the "sick man", "analysts" suddenly started to spread rumours on negative expectations and even the usual "misunderstanding" happaned again today. Some time ago the prestigeous Bloomberg translated a sentence of the prime minister incorrectly causing panic among "investors". Today the Hungarian agency for overseeing the financial markets misteriously was left out from a common statement of such authorities in ECE, pointing out the negative effects of unfounded allegations regarding the situation of banks in the region and emphasizing the differences in the situation of the countries. It was soon interpreted as a gesture of dissociation from Hungary, as if its situation would be the only problem in the region. Hungarian forint suddenly fell while other currencies in the region became stronger against euro. A choir of "experts" and "analysts" in Hungary were ready to hail the idea of dissociation, portraying Hungary as a country not able to grasp the severity of the situation and prophesizing that Europe will leave this state alone as it is not ready to bring about the necessary changes. The opposite trend of the ECE currencies while during trade hours today was immediately interpreted as a turn in the events, the markets at last realizing that only Hungary has problems and that only thi country is not willing to adapt itself to the needs of the moment. One "expert" (well, he is a model figure, general director of local investment funds of a multinational company, whose funds performed rather mediocry last year even though this genius - who two weeks after the fall of the Lehman Brothers issued a statement, that we were over the worst, the markets would calm down and 2009 would be a year of moderate growth - is in charge), this expert even interpreted Obama's remark consisting the names of Hungary and Ukraine as a diplomatic message to Hungary, expressing the opinion that Hungary flawed its economic policy.

It is not easy to retain even just a small fraction of composure in the light of those developments. I would admit that in the short run it could be a profitable tactics to portray every country in ECE as different ones, and buy yourself out from this mess at the expense of the others. (Although I'm henceforward inclined to think that any kind of failure in the region would eventually lead to the collapse of other countries, as "investor's" hands are shaky.) But even not to consider whether the crisis revealed more substantial factors behind the situatation than the simple malevolence of some obscure outer world full of bankers and speculants driven by thirst for profit and the bluntness of some millions of Americans making unbearable debts, that's something I would consider intellectual laziness. The more because it is a challenging problem, more challenging than posing as "experts" while only selling others ideas.

But another important problem, revealed by these events and opinions, regarding also the situation of ECE is the concept of economic and social time. (I mean the time necessary for profound transformations, long-run processes, evaluation of success or failure and time inherent in business and economic cycles etc.) As I mentioned in one of the earlier posts, in the transition period (not even finished today) one of the important issues was the time necessary for the catch up. It was always evaluated to be digestible (10-15 years), therefore no one was ready to admit that

a, he/she has no idea

or

b, it will last for many decades and many people (obviously voters at the next election) won't have a chance to experience it.

Economists, considered to be serious academics supported this assupmtion and began to evaluate definitive success of one country, and failure of the other in terms of economic preformance in one, two or three years at the best. They were even not ready to consider the possibility of changes in economic or social policy in this time span in the respective countries, not to speak of the horrifying perspective that growth is not necessarily self-sustaining, circumstances can be changed with the time and so on. Instead of making thorough analyses, using historical comparison based on data and facts they simply assumed that two or three good years are the sign of perennial economic success and two or three bad years prove that the respective country is doomed. The real time span of convergence - historically decades - were rejected, economic time was significantly distorted.

This fact in itself would have been enough to make a weird perception of economic time - either unrealistic or not in line with the peculiarities of economic history - dominant. But the situation was worsened by the emergence of brokers and "analysts" as "experts" and "economists". They were used to mesuring economic events and processes in days or in weeks at best and very often in hours. So-called economic websites and following their example others as well, began to provide news of the "fall" or "rise" of the currencies based on one or two trading hours. One can wake up with the news that forint collapsed or was "hit" and go to sleep with forint risen incredibly against euro or dollar. The same was true for the stock market as well. (For example as I'm writing this post forint regained today's losses completly and taking into account the primary cause of today's fall this is a similar performance to the other currencies today. I won't forecast that this trend will be continued or not as I'm not capable to do it, moreover, I think it is pointless, as the long run is more important. But if I were an "analyst", at the moment I would be completly justified to say that forint is moving in line with the regional trend.) As this is the dominant economic news, the perception of economic trends in general was transformed accordingly. Today every "expert" can forecast decades of economic develpoment from the events of the first few minutes at the markets.

How is this phenomenon connected to the problem of ECE? As I tried to outline earlier, ECE is perceived as a bunch of competing country's, front runners and laggers. But because of the distortion of economic (and historical) time, success is not estimated according to the necessary time span, but based on short term performance, not taking into account other factors. Therefore possible similarities, having their effects in the long run, are obscured by short term differences. Moreover, non-economic factors, like the necesity of a kind of social consensus expressed through the results of elections, possible changes in the demands of the electorate influencing economic policies are also erased from the model. This is not the perception of time necessary to operate democratic procedures, but the perception of time of enlightened absolutism, as democratic governments never will have enough time to act if they are judged based on one or two days movements on the markets.

Well, there is some hope. Obama, at the press conference cited above, made a remark, that he wouldn't adapt his action to the daily ups and downs of the stock exchange indices, rather he is willing to concentrate on long term objectives. He even made an analogy with the tracking polls in politics, expressing his opinion - ceratinly based on some experience - that the politician who acts according to daily movements in polls will lost the strategical objective. This part of the press conference obviosuly wasn't mentiond by our "expert".

P.S.: Something on today's events... and on similarities, differences.