Showing posts with label austerity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label austerity. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 14, 2011

On thin ice?

Hungary's prime minister is in full gear. With declining popularity and approval ratings he is convinced that it is due to his government's inability to make people understand how well they are treated. Instead they believe in the lies of the opposition. As a result Viktor Orbán appears everywhere, gives interviews (even to reporters earlier exiled to remote corners of the public media) and engages the opposition in the parliament. (Contrary to the British custom there is no informal obligation of the premier to participate on Prime Minister's Questions every week.) Additionally he visits friendly societies, in order to clarify his program for faithful followers. 

Aside from the obvious ominous signs - what to expect from people supposedly belonging to the country's business elite who are listening to Orbán's contradictio in adiecto statements without objection, moreover, taking it with applause - the prime minister made yesterday an interesting comment in one of these circles. He referred to that although it is almost impossible to introduce fixed exchange rate it is worth to contemplate the possibility. 

Given the self-proclaimed and proudly borne "unorthodox" nature of the economic policy of the government, such a hint is not necessarily as meaningless as one would be inclined to take it. There is at least one recent example that a country managed to regain competitiveness and growth with a set of measures including capital - and implicitly exchange rate - controls. Paul Krugman gladly compares the example of Iceland as a country that took a more traditional devaluation focused IMF approach in the aftermath of its crisis to the European countries taking the internal devaluation path. Iceland is an example for a country's potential to convince the IMF  that act of its own design can serve the common aim of returning to growth just as well as the IMF's proposals. According to the latest IMF report on Iceland the government insisted on capital controls in order to make devaluation (and implicitly inflating away debt) easier with pre-empting capital flight.

In the light of Iceland's performance, much praised by the IMF, even the idea that Hungary's leaders are contemplating something similar cannot be written off easily. However, some caveats should be made here concerning the viability of a possible change of strategy. Firstly, Iceland started negotiations with the EU on its accession simultaneously with its IMF program. On the one hand it means a strong pledge that capital controls and exchange rate manipulation will remain temporary, on the other hand it was free from the EU rules, something not given for Hungary, part of a joined EU-IMF credit program. It is hard to see in Hungary’s case how EU law can be eliminated, even if it allows for reintroduction of capital controls in case of economic danger. Secondly, Hungary is still following the path of classic austerity – despite the government’s insistence on the opposite –, it is “on the Greek road”, as Orbán likes to formulate. Even if it is possible to change track, the austerity already has forced its citizens to deplete their reserves, it has not strengthened its banking system (as Iceland did), rather weakened it in the last year, and the typical neo-liberal reforms (for example on the labour market) proudly passed in Parliament yesterday do not suggest the government’s willingness to take an alternative route in order to share the burdens of the crisis more fairly. Thirdly, and this point is knit the former, Orbán has a distorted vision of Hungarian society, impeding him to realize policies strengthening equality. Yesterday he also announced that his policies are aimed at strengthening the middle class. However, the latest income statistic of the Statistical Office showed that people with a monthly per capita net income of 130000 HUF (400 EUR, equivalent of 200000 HUF gross wage) in 2010 belonged to the top income decile. Fidesz’s new flat-tax in 2011 meant a tax raise for everyone with a gross wage under 290000 HUF. One can safely guess that Orbán’s policy – however strongly he is convinced of the opposite – benefits only 4-5% of the population, and certainly not the middle class, only the elite. And last, but not least, a sudden change of track would not only need approval from Hungary’s creditors (something certainly not happening without clearly formulated and well founded strategy), but a bit more capacity to act than the government has shown until today.

Wednesday, September 14, 2011

Disorderly devaluation?


The saga of the conversion of fx-loans in Hungary goes on. According to a report at the Hungarian website origo.hu the government's main aim is to regain freedom of exchange rate determination and practically carry out a devaluation of the forint, without hurting households with fx-loans. As I'm no friend of this government I'm sceptical a bit, no government politician or supporter used this argumentation until today. However, if it is true it is just an even stronger proof of the incompetence of the government.

I know that I was arguing – not that it would matter the slightest – on behalf of external devaluation, therefore to declare a seemingly identical argumentation could seem paradox. Nonetheless, it is hard to treat the government's proposal as fulfilling the three necessary preconditions of a successful devaluation through the conversion of fx-loans. Any attempt should be comprehensive in its extent, prompt in its execution and orderly regarding the covering of losses and managing the inevitable risks. In this case none of the above preconditions exists.

The volume of fx-loans is around 1 million households. The ration of non-performing loans is around 10%. The proposal of the government intends to cover only 300 000 at best, so, the remaining 700 000 would still make a very significant electoral base not to let the forint devalue. And this is the maximal number the government claims will have an opportunity to make the conversion. The Minister of National Economy allegedly argued that only 50 or 100 billion HUF loss will be incurred to the banks, a sum that gives only about 75 000 existing loans converted. Hardly a reduction enabling the government to devalue.

Neither is the proposal prompt enough to make a sufficient reduction for a quick devaluation. Although the prime minister told yesterday that only a limited time frame would be allowed to the debtors to make the conversion (a solution with many – albeit very different – risks), this evening the reports states that the possibility will be open indefinitely. So, even with the compulsory lending of forint based loans prescribed for the banks the process would be slow (given the practical and procedural necessities, finding the suitable new loan, preparing the documentation etc.) and without it it will only be a cherry picking of the better debtors. Meanwhile everyone will avoid the not so promising clients, effectively reducing the number of conversions and therefore postponing the restoration of freedom of exchange rate manipulation. With the process underway for months or probably even for years the economy can not have the boost hoped from the devaluation.

It is again hardly an orderly solution. Although the distribution of the losses is clearly settled at least for the time being* nothing else seems to be in place to impede the dangerous process induced by the conversion. First of all there could be a long period of risen demand for forint that will inevitably lead to higher interest rates, while the exchange rate will be depressed (but probably not depressed enough to lift the exports significantly) to compel the National Bank to raise its policy rate and simultaneously inflating the country's foreign currency denominated sovereign debt. Even at the present rate of 286-287 forint for one euro the debt grew with 800 billion forint, 26+ of the amount the government reduced it back in summer. It would effectively mean the end of the debt reduction course, up to this moment the main objective of government policy.**

Beyond the practical issues the new strategy (external devaluation) is the third one in 16 months. Initially there was an attempt for a stimulus through tax cuts that almost immediately failed due to policy constraints. The EU forbade any deviation form the agreed deficit target of 3,8% of GDP. During the autumn the government made an experiment with classic austerity and tax cuts, but the budget collapsed already in January, leading to the very typical austerity program (internal devaluation), the Széll Kálmán plan and the primary objective of forced and fast debt reduction. And now the government turned around again, this time opting for external devaluation. Albeit not in a very sensitive way. (It is worth to take a look at what happened in Iceland, where – with the assistance of the IMF – a consolidation program based on external devaluation was carried out successfully. It needed far more and far stronger cooperation and effort than the Hungarian government envisages.) And not only the sudden and unexpected turns and twists speak fro themselves, there are a lot of contradiction between these strategies. Austerity is the opposite of the stimulus, while external and internal devaluations are hardly reconcilable and the former will initially raise the debt to GDP ratio. A sensitive mixture of these approaches would still be possible (especially of the first and the third), but it would need a more complex and sensible approach, one that calculates with every possible effect and takes into account every potential risk. Unfortunately the only economic quality the government seems to possesses is a very high marginal propensity for gambling.


* However, the prime minister admitted yesterday that the EU Court would most probably declare the move illegal, order compensation and fine Hungary, but he was eager to assure the people that they do not need to fear, the state will take this burden.

** There are a numerous other risks. For example the conversion means the liquidation of Hungarian assets and payment of huge sums to foreign creditors. Reducing national wealth and handing it over to foreigners, a reduction of the capital and with it the possible base of investment, and obviously will have a negative impact on the current account.

Monday, August 8, 2011

August again, leaders on holiday - what about a new Marshall-plan?

Not that it would be a typical one, with almost unbearable heat, slowly radiating from the walls of houses and even the shade of trees not offering relief without the breeze. And I don't believe in theories that for some mysterious reason August would be a month dedicated to and the most suitable for catastrophic events to happen. But after another half a year of "it is a strong recovery, fundamentals are OK, everything will be perfect, only those profligate Greeks should make themselves more accommodated to the inevitable decline of their living standards and work more" narrative suddenly the whole world seems to accept that we are on the verge of absolute collapse and disaster. (So much for the rationality of markets. ;) ) Well, according to the most capable economic leadership in any country of the world Hungary is a safe haven, China will defend it from anything that would happen. But otherwise, the world is doomed. (Just look at exchange rate and the bond yield curve of the last days, no sign of Chinese buying Hungarian debt at least not with discount.)

In a sense it is undeniable, but - I hope for many - not exactly the events are the most worrying, but the apparent lack of any kind of leadership and ideas,
what to do and how to act in order to avert the worst. What we only have is a renewed argument whether neo-Keynesians have it wrong or not, whether we should eliminate deficit now and at once or not, whether tax cuts will bring the so urgently needed growth. But as the events unfold no one seems to make an attempt to exert control over them. Those, who are supposed to be leaders, are just gaping at the incoming storm. However, even if sometimes the situation seems to be the contrary, it is lack of invention and new ideas that lies at the root of the sudden outburst of the crisis, everyone hoped (and thought) to have buried very deep. As the debates show the faith in the capacity of the states to act is shaken but there is no other entity to turn to in distress. To leave it for the market is a good idea but it would surely be suicide. Sovereig default would certainly bring down banks and companies, wiping out their - real or imaginary - wealth and resources, and of course individuals too, leading to the - at least temporary - death of those very markets we should turn to. The markets would like to see the states resolving the crisis, but abhor from most of the solutions offered. As long as the present crisis is seen singularly as a competitiveness issue - and not a lack of sufficient demand in the world- the markets will demand more and more austerity, leading to even less demand and so on. It is certainly a delusion from the recovery that the possibility of growth is associated exclusively with competitiveness as if Say's law would be unconditionally true. Despite the fact that in the light of recent revelations the performance of some economies in the last more than one year was probably driven by Chinese and US quantitative easing, creating a favorable environment at the emerging markets. Probably it is really not so easy to accept that extreme high German growth was not something given because the Germans are industrious workers but because there was demand somewhere for their products. (Even if the significant slowing in the last months would suggest otherwise.) The problem is that as long as the demand side is not really taken into account no one is really ready to accept: austerity might bring about the classic deflationary spiral.

Furthermore, the addressing of the international imbalances, the rebalancing of economies has not even begun. Even in Germany with its vigorous growth internal demand remained suppressed, and show only modest strengthening, while the German industry  has till not reached its peak output before the crisis. Not to speak of the other major and minor economies. According to the last IMF report on China even the authorities accept the necessity to direct the country to a more balanced economic model, with better social services, comprehensive pension and health care system, cheaper social housing, all costly and serving as automatic stabilizers but hopefully enhancing internal demand - for imports as well. With the turnaround of emerging economies the developed one could probably better rely on external demand, making plans of debt reduction based on exports via growing competitiveness more realistic, and not only them: there is the Eastern periphery of the EU too. Anyhow, one thing is clear: reform and spending cuts are no quick fix for the problems and even if there would be capacity and determination to implement them at once it would need a lot of time to change the course of those economies and generate growth that would make debt reduction credible.
Unfortunately there are complementary problems concerning the possible resolution of the crisis, structural ones but this time not on the labour market nor in the tax system, but at the very heart of economic governance, and well beyond the all-too-known issue of the Eurozone being a monetary union without a fiscal one. These structural problems mean serious constraint on the possible path of action for politicians and central bankers and accompanied with the lack of imagination makes the successful escape from the crisis one of the least possible outcomes.

The classic panacea for debt is threefold:
- faster growth
- austerity
- inflation
and these are often interlocked and interwoven.

The austerity is only viable in a benign and favorable international environment; when growing export markets offer a substitute for weakening internal demand fast enough to avert a long lasting economic slump. In case of an independent currency the fastest and easiest way is devaluation, otherwise harsh cuts in production costs are needed (and austerity to make it credible that the declining budget revenues won't lead to soaring deficit) and thus the restored competitiveness would enable producers to outbid their rivals. However, at the end the whole process could turn out to be a classic beggar-thy-neighbour policy, reducing cost in competition forcing others to do it and making gains in export at the cost of others and not as a result of a expansionary economic environment.
In order to avoid such successes being short-lived sustainable faster growth at the end needs more demand from somewhere, therefore the first option is very much constrained by the international environment again, if there is no opportunity to generate internal demand. Thus the present economc situation  is anything but favorable to these options: no chance of a devaluation as it is either impossible due to the lack of own currency or due to the practical peg in currencies of countries where significant part of individual, corporate and state debt is foreign currency denominated. And with a markedly slowing world economy - according to some it is almost certainly will be in recession in the second half of the year - there is no internal demand to rely on while austerity wipes out internal.

There is of course the third option - inflation. Most of the debt problems in the last century (actually even before that) were eliminated with this option. Whether it is fair or not, it is an effective way to reduce debt-to-GDP ratio and reduce the value of claims on the state and on the individual as well. Not inflation indexed debt will soon lose its real value when facing 4-5-6% or even higher inflation with negative real interest rates. The problem here is twofold: without the chance to devalue (that is inflationary per se) it can only be achieved by issuing money (and/or directly monetizing debt). But money issuance is usually the privilege of Central Banks that are independent of government, exactly for this reason: not to let the latter monetize their debt and inflate away the problem. 

There are of course psychological factors here in play too. Many fear - and it is not unjustified - from high and protracted inflation as it can be very destructive and usually distributes the burden unfairly across social groups. Furthermore it can push upwards bond rates, just aggravating the sovereign debt situation, making the financing of a country more and not less harder. And there is the much dreaded phenomenon of stagflation, when inflation fails to bring growth and while prices are soaring, the economy still flatlines. So, even if it can really offer a solution - as recently the IMF's chief economist, Olivier Blanchard suggested - it requires desperation and leadership and it can probably achieved only at the price of giving up ideas like the independence of central banks. (As it would need the revocation of their independent right for setting rates and issuing money. But as an ultimate solution at the edge of complete disaster it is still an option - an option that also needs time, at least a bill should be passed in parliament.)

There is of course a substitute for inflation, implemented in the last years too, quantitative easing. This time the central bank pumps money into the financial sector, either buying assets - sovereign bonds etc. - at the market. It is presumed that this money will find its way to companies who want to invest or to individuals who will spend it, because the more money is circulating in the system the less constrained are the banks to lend them. (In a sense it is again Say's law...) Sometimes it works, but in the last years it only had some unintended consequences and perverse effects: a rally at the emerging market stock exchanges and soaring commodity prices, at the end not enhancing the capacity of individuals and companies in the respective developed economies to spend more, but reducing it. The problem lies in the method of pumping the money in the system: through the intermediaries of banks. For companies, As long as demand is sluggish and existing capacities are underutilized (which is certainly the case now, when even Germany has not reached its peak output again) this is just cheap money to reinvest in financial assets (or in cae of a tax cut it is just additional profit).For the individuals this is not necessarily welcome. Those, who are deleveraging (i.e. paying down their debt) the main concern is not how they could take more debt on themselves, but how they could earn more money to pay their monthly rates. (And again: if it would be a tax cut, it would most probably be spent almost immediately on existing debt.) But the main problem - especially in declining economies is to produce something and sell it. (However, it also can be a problem for a rebalancing economy. For example if the US would need to export more and import less in a drive towards a more balanced economy then they also would need to produce something and sell it.) And the main reason they are not doing it is lack of sufficient demand: there are still underutilized capacities, internal demand is suppressed by austerity, external demand suffers from the end of cheap money at the emerging markets and consequently from the slowing of the global economy. So, the task for politicians and economists is twofold: they must ensure that money pumped into the economy is used to purchase - in a very broad sense - additional products in order to make output growing. And the main obstacles they have to face are: fears of sovereign default even in case of economies with an own currency (thus there is no room for fiscal stimulus); and fears of inflation (thus there is no room for monetizing debt).

At this point I’m not claiming that I would be more imaginative than our leaders. But reading Tony Judt’s Postwar made an embryonic idea growing in my mind. If states need to circumvent the obstacles of the markets who perceive every non-conventional action to lift internal demand as dangerous, while conventional action accepted by the markets was proven ineffective then what to do? It is clear that somehow money should be given to companies in order to make them produce, to individuals in order to make them buy goods… Actually something resembling of the post-war Marshall-plan can be a daring attempt but maybe not doomed to fail.

In case of the Marshal-plan goods from the US were transported to the participant countries according to their wishes that were based on plans. These could be consumer goods, investment goods, commodities etc. Usually the US delivered and paid for it, from its own treasury and the receiving countries used them. Either fed the population or built up infrastructure or plants etc. But it always created second tier effects in the receiving countries while it pumped money into US companies – who otherwise would have to face the rapid decline of military orders. Something similar could probably allow distressed countries to invest (in plants, infrastructure, services, human capital, education etc.) and thus generate not only income for their population but lay the foundations of later exports and ensure a healthy level of new orders for companies in the donor countries. (The Germans are planning something on a much lower scale in Greece, but with not much haste and with too old-fashioned methods: offering investment chances for companies.)

There are of course risks and institutional problems as well. Everything should be well-planned and at least moderately effective, i.e. there is no room for huge misallocation for investment, a reason to implement good planning, just in case of the Marshall-plan. Furthermore, few states can be the donors directly, as it would only make their debt grow. But there are ways to bypass these last obstacles. Not only would it be desirable to extend the program to the world (as a means to help addressing international imbalances and rebalancing of economies) but it would distribute the risk very broadly, Furthermore, there are institutions in the world system and in the EU that could implement such a program: the two reconstruction banks, World Bank and EBRD. For example if the EU would decide to issue Eurobonds – and they wouldn’t immediately pass on the money raised to distressed countries – they can place it into a huge reconstruction fund and finance the new Marshall-plan in Europe. They have to capitalize with it the EBRD and then let them coordinate the planning. afterwards the Germans and French can deliver the goods – paid from the fund - to the Greeks, who could earn their wages while using it or selling it or buying it… And the money would at least cover one and a half transaction and not immediately sucked up outstanding debt.
It is far from being an easy and elegant solution and it would still require a lot of human effort. It depends on the capacity and ability of a lot of individuals. But at least it offers the elimination of the main obstacles in the way of a lasting solution and addresses a real problem and not an imaginary one.

Friday, March 11, 2011

Hungary, even more path-dependent?

Hungary is again pushing forward on its path towards its demise with the so-called Széll Kálmán-plan and the Draft Constitution. It would be (or probably will be) entertaining to analyze the constitution in depth in the light of Fidesz's organic/integral nationalism, how it correpsonds to this idea.JUst as it would be important to give a more detailed coverage of the economic plicies of the government, sometimes seemingly sane, but considered in its entirety lunatic at all, again very much an expression of the above mentioned ideology. However, in this post I will only formulate some preliminary thoughts and conclusions on one of the most worrisome aspects of the new constitution.


1. The new constitution will implement a debt ceiling at 50% of the GDP (although the GDP they measure to will not necessarily be identical with the Eurostat/National Office of Statistics data, a separate law will define it). Legislation on taxes and social contribution, as well as on the pension system will be subject of laws passed by a qualified - 2/3 - majority. It seems an exteremely rigid framework for any meaningful economic policy, practically requiering consent of the government and the opposition even to minor changes.
2. The government promised to bring down the debt-to-GDP ratio to 50% until 2018. The nationalization of rpivate pension funds can kickstart it and the government predicts a ratio between 65-70% in 2014 but 15% is still a long way to go. (Between 1998 and 2001, during their tenure they are still very proud of, Fidesz reduced the debt level from 62% to 53%, or 9% of GDP, with tight budgets between 1998 and 2000 and GDP growth around 4%.) 15% (more realistically around 20%) in four years seems a daring promise.

I tend to conclude the political intention and the legal framework will create a peculiar situation. Firstly, it will certainly put Hungary in the straitjacket of almost another decade of strong austerity, after 5 years from this experience. Moody's had some calculation on the possible scenarios of debt reduction and they concluded the 50% level is attainable only with an extraordinarily benevolent international environment and not quite realistically high growth rates. I would characterize it as voluntarism, and an extremely dangerous form of it.
Furthermore, there is a risk that the package - or more precisely the declaration of intention - announced last week - is simply not calculated properly. For example the Ministry of National Economy wants to spend the revenue from the electronic toll system entirely on debt reduction, while the Ministry of National Development counts on it as a source for the maintenance of public roads. Or, the government is propelling forward with a legislative package on public instruction, with an estimated annual extra cost between 300-500 billion HUF while the entire ammount of budget savings is estimated around 900 billion per year. And there is the danger, that they simply misinterpreted Hungary's economic woes. It seems they believe in the magic mixture of flat-tax (actually a significant tax-hike on labour in case of about 85% of the employed workeforce) and super-flexible labor market (i.e. very low level of social aid and unemployment benefits) just like Bajnai or earlier the Reform Alliance.
Meanwhile important elements of command economy appeared, especially the central regulation of prices for public services and utilities. But after it turned out that the new flat-tax is in fact a tax-hike they put pressure on employers to raise wages, now they threaten with legislation on this issue. And they couldn't find a solution for the problem of the fx-denominated loans, for the indebtedness of local authorities - the majority of which was controlled by Fidesz since 2006 and deliberately taking the path of making debts - and the PPP projects. The flat tax, due to the above mentioned reasons probably will not bring a significant rise in internal demand and households are still struggling with their debt and with rising public utility costs. I'm not really optimistic, although I can imagine the markets temporarily buying the package and waking up to an even worse situation after austerity bites but fails to bring meaningful growth.


P.S. It is again worth to look at Romania with its totally incompetent government, After narrowly escaping colapse and pushing thorugh a hard austerity package, still far from reducing budget deficit significantly enough, they are in a hurry to implement tax cuts. Although tehre is still no convincing proof that it could bring growth alone and Romanian is sliding down to large scale poverty with last years measures. Moreover, it will create a whole in the budget eytremely hard to patch, just look at Hungary, what is happening there. The government had to accept austerity after it carried out tax cuts around 500 billion HUF. Now, they have to cut public expenses, unemployment benefits, social aid etc. in order to save the money they handed out nicely, as a gift for the very rich and a narrow upper-upper middle class.