On the paradox of sovereignty

There should be nothing surprising in the Hungarian governments reluctance to accept the terms of the EU and the IMF for a new agreement, at least for those following the developments in Hungary. The EU insists on repeal of some recently passed legislation, while the IMF made very clear that there is no way Hungary can hope for anything else than a stand-by-agreement with hard policy conditionality. A detailed action plan, quarterly reviews, and again reinstatement of the fiscal policy framework dismantled  in the last twenty months. At least for the time all of this is unpalatable fro the Hungarian government - despite signs that they are trying to conclude their separate pact with the IMF with or without the Eu's blessing. (The government announced the chief of the Hungarian delegation will visit Washington for informal talks next January in order to meet with IMF general director Christine Lagarde, other directors and the staff responsible for Hungary, but there was nothing about reestablishing contact with Brussels and the EC.)

The reason behind this reluctance is - besides underestimating the risks most probably because government politicians are eyeing the reserves of the Hungarian National Bank as a source of liquidity that can enable the country to weather the storm until growth resume - a deeply seated desire for sovereignty. The conflict - fashioned as an economic war of liberation or independence - is about Hungary's ability to conduct its self-styled policies. One can argue - rightly - how short-sighted this old-fashioned concept of sovereignty is today, discuss how impossible is it nowadays to dissociate one country from the world, or point out that even the giants of the world are steering towards forms of collective world governance, even if only out of necessity. But the Hungarian situation conceals far more than a simple arch-conservative or super-traditionalist understanding of sovereignty. It is deeply paradox.

The government struggles to establish a precautionary or flexible credit line with the IMF, something they phrased as safety net or insurance, an agreement providing IMF money almost unconditionally in case of necessity - in the name of economic sovereignty. They reject conditionality because it would grant supervision over Hungarian policy decisions for a foreign institution.  However, one and a half years ago, at the wake of the previous IMF program everyone expected the parties will to arrange for exactly the same type of agreement. Then the Hungarian government suddenly disrupted the negotiations, after some days of hesitation and confusion announced the war of economic liberation on the IMF and proceeded with her unorthodox measures designed to resolve the problems that the IMF program was intended to resolve. It seemed the IMF won't ever return and sovereignty is regained successfully. Only one year passed and the necessity of a new understanding with the IMF seemed inevitable in order to avoid the worst. But - directly because of the disruption the government inflicted upon the country - the government has a very slim chance to get the desired flexible credit line. The one they would have easily got before the war started. They would have now their beloved sovereignty without the war. But the harder they fought for it the farther it slipped away...

P.S. Actually, if one looks after a similar concept of sovereignty there is one handy parallel in the neighborhood, albeit from some decades earlier. The Romanian government - not independently from the very strong nationalism in the country - thought of and acted similarly in the international community since 1918 and until 1989. Surprisingly their fervor for sovereignty somehow abated in the last decade, or at least they have learnt how to manoeuvre.

On thin ice?

Hungary's prime minister is in full gear. With declining popularity and approval ratings he is convinced that it is due to his government's inability to make people understand how well they are treated. Instead they believe in the lies of the opposition. As a result Viktor Orbán appears everywhere, gives interviews (even to reporters earlier exiled to remote corners of the public media) and engages the opposition in the parliament. (Contrary to the British custom there is no informal obligation of the premier to participate on Prime Minister's Questions every week.) Additionally he visits friendly societies, in order to clarify his program for faithful followers. 

Aside from the obvious ominous signs - what to expect from people supposedly belonging to the country's business elite who are listening to Orbán's contradictio in adiecto statements without objection, moreover, taking it with applause - the prime minister made yesterday an interesting comment in one of these circles. He referred to that although it is almost impossible to introduce fixed exchange rate it is worth to contemplate the possibility. 

Given the self-proclaimed and proudly borne "unorthodox" nature of the economic policy of the government, such a hint is not necessarily as meaningless as one would be inclined to take it. There is at least one recent example that a country managed to regain competitiveness and growth with a set of measures including capital - and implicitly exchange rate - controls. Paul Krugman gladly compares the example of Iceland as a country that took a more traditional devaluation focused IMF approach in the aftermath of its crisis to the European countries taking the internal devaluation path. Iceland is an example for a country's potential to convince the IMF  that act of its own design can serve the common aim of returning to growth just as well as the IMF's proposals. According to the latest IMF report on Iceland the government insisted on capital controls in order to make devaluation (and implicitly inflating away debt) easier with pre-empting capital flight.

In the light of Iceland's performance, much praised by the IMF, even the idea that Hungary's leaders are contemplating something similar cannot be written off easily. However, some caveats should be made here concerning the viability of a possible change of strategy. Firstly, Iceland started negotiations with the EU on its accession simultaneously with its IMF program. On the one hand it means a strong pledge that capital controls and exchange rate manipulation will remain temporary, on the other hand it was free from the EU rules, something not given for Hungary, part of a joined EU-IMF credit program. It is hard to see in Hungary’s case how EU law can be eliminated, even if it allows for reintroduction of capital controls in case of economic danger. Secondly, Hungary is still following the path of classic austerity – despite the government’s insistence on the opposite –, it is “on the Greek road”, as Orbán likes to formulate. Even if it is possible to change track, the austerity already has forced its citizens to deplete their reserves, it has not strengthened its banking system (as Iceland did), rather weakened it in the last year, and the typical neo-liberal reforms (for example on the labour market) proudly passed in Parliament yesterday do not suggest the government’s willingness to take an alternative route in order to share the burdens of the crisis more fairly. Thirdly, and this point is knit the former, Orbán has a distorted vision of Hungarian society, impeding him to realize policies strengthening equality. Yesterday he also announced that his policies are aimed at strengthening the middle class. However, the latest income statistic of the Statistical Office showed that people with a monthly per capita net income of 130000 HUF (400 EUR, equivalent of 200000 HUF gross wage) in 2010 belonged to the top income decile. Fidesz’s new flat-tax in 2011 meant a tax raise for everyone with a gross wage under 290000 HUF. One can safely guess that Orbán’s policy – however strongly he is convinced of the opposite – benefits only 4-5% of the population, and certainly not the middle class, only the elite. And last, but not least, a sudden change of track would not only need approval from Hungary’s creditors (something certainly not happening without clearly formulated and well founded strategy), but a bit more capacity to act than the government has shown until today.

An action plan of indecision? Updated

Hungary's new prime minister, Viktor Orbán announced yesterday his "action plan" a set of measures seen as the guidelines of the government's economic policy. The announcement followed days of insecurity caused by remarks of Fidesz and government officials on the budget deficit this year, frequently using phrases "like Greece", "default" etc. This debacle (retrospectively Fidesz politicians - speaking only from behind the defense line of anonimity - hinted to a conscious strategy, but the party has a tendency to reinterpret every failure afterwards into a plan of a mastermind, therefore it is less and less credible with time) signaled the abandonment of earlier ideas and the realignment of the possible policies.

Anyway, the prime minister delivered a very conscious speech conveying the will and energy to achieve his goals and announcing 29 measures. It had an immediate effect, it was certainly a good show of an illusionist, especially among Hungarian analysts, whose obsession with flat-tax is almost a medical case. Many of them hurried to hail the greatest structural change of the last two decades etc. And the impression in general was certainly favorable, on the surface the new policy seemed to be really well thought. Nevertheless, if scrutinized with a more critical eye - without allowing oneself to be deluded by the flat-tax - it is a surprisingly empty and astonishingly not elaborated package.

The starting point was that the government has to achieve a budget deficit as high as 3,8% of GDP this year, because the IMF and the EU (espacially the latter) would not let them to raise th target to 5-7%. However, Fidesz promised a "tax revolution" in the campaign (although it was clear that they couldn't decide whether to opt for flat-tax or a family-tax system, copying the French model) and tax cuts for enterprises. After they lost a lot of room for manoeuvre when they had to accept the lower deficit figures they still stuck to this idea and decided to find other sources of revenues to offset the income losses. The solution was imaginative but not quite convincing: the banks will pay a half of their profit to the budget in order to allow them to relax the tax burden on individuals and on other companies. Besides the 16% falt tax combined with the family tax the prime minister announced the reduction of the wage costs in the public sector, reduction of tax on companies' profit (at least for those who has a profit less than 500 million HUF) from 19% to 10%, complete freedom of distilling spirits for individuals (really!) a freeze of public services fees for the population, a ban on mortgage based fx-loans and some symbolic measures, for example reducing costs in the state sector and subventions to political parties.

However coherent it seems (and the underlying idea, even if its is horrific, is really coherent) it do not need a Nobel-prize winner to discover how scratchy it is nd how much it lacks the essence of political action: decision on some core issues and acceptance of confrontation. First of all it is still not a decision to fuse two tax systems based on very different principles, it is the opposite: an escape from decision. Considering this state of affairs it is not quite surprising that today none ion the government was capable to give information on details. There will be something with a 16% flat tax rate and with tax breaks and credits for families raising children, but to wich amount the latter will extend, what will happen with the so-called "szuperbruttó" in the present system ("super-gross calculation" an effective extension of the tax base, it taxes the ammount of the social contribution as if they would be part of the income itself) and the tax rebate. Even more serious issue is the problem of "lower wages". The present system - due to a very extended tax rebate - lays only 16% tax on a monthly income of 230000 Huf well over average and median wage in Hungary. The elimination of this part of the system was announced - in two years - which at first sight will effectively mean a tax hike for everyone with 230000 Huf or lower income. There were hints that the government will ensure that no one pay more, but there seem to be no other solution than to raise wages, but an effective 20% wage raise will not deliver one if the most sacred result of as flat tax system (at least in the eyes of its adherents): lower labour costs. (On the idea that it will create incentives to present previously untaxed incomes for the tax authority you can see my earlier post. The very theory used to support the flat tax contradicts to this idea. There is no evidence, ECE countries with flat tax are more infected with black and grey economic activity than Hungary, according to every estimate.)

Similarly vague is the idea of the reduction of costs of public services. It is even not clear whether this applies to the entire public sector, only to certain parts of it or to the state owned companies? While the prime minister mentioned 120 billion Huf as saving for this year and referred to it as 15% reduction of these costs, the only concrete measure was a 48 billion reduction at state owned companies. (But it is tricky as it is the 15% of the wage bill for the entire year while the cuts will come in the second half. The result: 25-30% for six months!) Whether public instiutions, ministries, authorities or schools, the health care sector etc. will bore the remaining 72 billion or just a part of it it is still not clear.

The freeze on public services prices was declared to be temporary, until the government negotiates something with the respective companies. However, price control will soon be reestablished. The bank tax announced without preliminary consultations. Even the method of "liberating" spirit distillation is not clear., it is at the moment not more then a wish list without calculations. And it is based on a very tight calculation, without any reserves and always counting on the most optimistic scenario. If the bank tax falls of or fails to deliver the necessary amount, if growth will remain sluggish the deficit will soar up and austerity will settle to other sectors. Moreover, even the real extent of tax cuts is not clear, because no one knows the amount of family tax breaks and rebate and the future of the present tax rebates. Therefore no realistic calculation of the effect of the package on the budget is possible. (And no structural reforms - some percentage points relaxation in an already almost flat-tax system is far from being one, across the board cuts in the public sector can also be seen hardly as such,Gyurcsány would have been ridiculed by the same "analysts" with a similar action plan who are now praising Orbán.) We have seen the sorcerer, the white rabbit was fat and juicy but it evaporated in a day....

However, the direction is clear: redistribution of wealth from the lower strata to the rich (the very rich) and from the poorest regions to the richest quarters of Budapest. It's negative effect on local economies is predictable as purchasing power will dissipate (while the positive effects of creating jobs is doubtful at best, the recovery could easily turn out to be fragile with the austerity programs of EU governments, the most far-sighted ideas of the Fidesz program were postponed - investment into energy efficiency, for example - or even thrown off etc.) and already huge differences in the country will grow. Well, the show was excellent, but the road is still covered by thick fog.

Update: So, we have a plan with the aim to keep under control the budget deficit and boost competitiveness through lower labour costs. But the secretary of state in the ministry of national economy responsible for tax issues announced today that the "szuperbruttó" will be eliminated and no one will be worse off in the new system (i.e. no one will have lower net income) than in the old one. No details, of course.

But even in this very basic and vague form the plan seems to be way off the announced aims. If the government will pressure companies to raise wages it will negatively affect labour costs without an equivalent raise in productivity. At the moment the average wage of 56500 physical workers in the agriculture is 109746 HUF. They would need a 12,2% higher wage in order to have the same level of net wage. But it would mean an additional 3,5% in higher social contributions as well. Similarly, the (non-existent) average industrial worker (441900 people) will need a 7% rise in wages what would mean an additional 2% in social contributions. The 195900 workers in the commercial sector will need a 10,7% higher salary, an additional 2,9% burden in social contribution. Moreover, the state employs hundreds of thousands of public sector workers and teachers, nurses etc. who also will have to enjoy the benefit of higher salaries in order to offset negative effects - if the secretary of state mentioned above told the truth. 3,5% raise for average employees in the health care sector (148300 people), 13% for physical workers in the same sector (90200 people), 10% for physical workers in the educational sector etc. Certainly more than 30 billion HUF just in order to compensate them real wages still declining. It is still not a well thought plan, just improvisation.

Something worth to read - from Barcelona

One piece, one author, two versions. Worth to read...

Relief and self-congratulation

Hungary is certainly not a peaceful country nowadays, but the growing tensions – albeit connected to the crisis and social poverty – are never directly associated with the financial and economic crisis. Regarding this issue a cautious stance prevails, emphasizing more and more positive effects of the governments measures. The parties behind it seem to accept their fate with resignation, and some of their politicians are ready to think that the cure prescribed by the „experts”, the business elite and the IMF – this at last showed some muscle recently in Romania and in the Ukraine (although only after prolonged period of a total lack of compliance in the former and a skillful tactics of „promise-and-non-fulfillment” in the other) is bringing its first fruits. (Even if it would be the case why are the same fruits sweet for supposedly leftist politicians as for not just supposedly rightist businessmen?) Anyway, the prime minister and the finance minister gave a series of interviews recently confirming that the budget deficit will remain as agreed with the IMF-EU couple and the fiscal restriction has its first effects: Hungary will emerge from this Maelstroem as the most competitive country in ECE.
Faithful readers can be already familiar with my views on this very simplistic and deadly perception of the world – I rarely felt myself better as an underpaid academic knowing that meanwhile I'm living in a very competitive county. The whole idea of competition instead of cooperation in ECE is one of the reasons of the mess we are experiencing. The clear demands and preferences of the society – usually expressed by vote – were always neglected in the name of competivity, as disadvantageous for business etc. and of course as remnants of some dangerous post-socialist, post-communist mindset, incompatible with democracy and capitalism. This stance even reached such heights as to accept lying to the electorate if it serves the aims of the business elite (and middle-class) but despising it if it turned out that the lies veiled a somewhat different, socially more balanced politics.
(One must admit that nowadays a different approach is gaining strength, the one arguing that the failure of transformation – that is in a sense an exaggeration – was caused by social pschychological factors and the mentality. This would be the real hindrance before the implementation of reforms. However, the proposed solution is not to develop ideas fitting to the social realities, rather somehow transform the mentality in order to implement the reforms, that are perceived as having no alternatives.)
Returning to the topic of this post, the government certainly can cite analysts predicting that Hungary will be the most competitive, most fabulous country. (On the one hand it is really comforting, at least no country will be at the end spared of the pains. :) ) But I fear analysts once again won't register success with their predictions, as they didn't before the crisis and since then. (A series of important data appeared in the last two weeks, for example GDP growth rates, and analyst's consensus was usually far from the real data. In case of Hungary they were disappointed but once again nobody asked whether their profession has any relevance, whether they deserve the attention paid to them. If analysts has something wrong, it is always the government's, the politics' the kádárist's fault and not theirs.) The real problem is that these forecasts are based on the usual simplistic model, somehow calculating a potential GDP growth (that is a very slippery issue, the oracle from Delphoi could be almost as successful as analysts, as the future is not known for anybody...). In this case they rely on the assumption – at least as I understand – that lower taxes are an incentive to hire workers, because cheaper labour makes producer prices more competitive and it will lead automatically to a higher employment rate. (What they will produce and first of all who will buy it, it is not a question. As in case of some economists, who – arguing that the lasting problems of labour market participation in Hungary needs a systemic approach instead of the present fragmented one, based on different education programs and state subsidies – came up with the all-encompassing and very systemic solution: in crisis regions a lower minimal wage have to be agreed upon.)
Nevertheless, this issue – what to produce and for whom – would be crucial as export based industry in Hungary was quite competitive even in the recent years (although the effects of the crisis are not clear at the moment), but for example a 5 point cut of the social contributions from July didn't had significant effects on employment, business was not capable to hire workers just for the sake of paying lower labour cost, the unemployment rate was kept at bay only by state-financed public work programs. Maybe next years similar cuts will have a different effect, maybe growing export markets will contribute to the easing of the situation. However, it has its clear limits as well.
Unfortunately the core of the problem lies in the SME-s, oriented towards domestic consumers in services, retail sales, construction. Although lower taxes would seemingly be good for them as well, not only due to lower labor costs (although paying less for some employees not necessarily enough to hire a new one, especially if there is no demand for the products), but through higher net income of the population. But the competivity issue in the export oriented sectors is a hindrance of wage raises as well, making the effects of tax cuts limited. Another possible solution would be redistribution to those whose “marginal propensity to consume” is higher – i.e. who are poor and can not afford even the basic needs on a daily basis – but it is also despised, as not business friendly. For a while credit substituted for real growth of income, but the result is too painfully clear. Without significantly higher wages there won't be really higher demand for services and construction. Moreover, lower taxes usually mean fewer public services or more expensive ones. Effects of tax cuts on personal incomes – especially in a country with lower wages – can be almost entirely offset by higher costs of public services. But not much SME-s will be content, when people will spend their excess money on train tickets instead of a hair cut. It would again flow to the state and not to the companies.
But the simplistic “lower taxes bring higher employment” assumption's validity is doubtful because of other reasons. The immobility, low education, low skills of the workforce reserve (the employment rate was 58% at its best now it is around 55%, the reserve is guessed sometimes at about 1 million people) would make investment necessary. Investment in mobility – affordable housing, not rents as high as a monthly wage, reasonably priced or state supported traffic costs etc., (the company's contribution to public traffic costs of their employees will become a taxable income from 1 January) – and in education would be much needed, but for this aim also redistribution would be much needed. At least as long as offering chances for everyone is perceived as necessary social solidarity and means of cohesion. If not ..., yes, it is another country.
(Moreover, there is a fair chance that at the end, with a rapidly ageing population and dependency ratio, without a European social system, Hungary will end up as having only one chance, to export more and more, making this whole speculation on possible ways out pointless. But even in this case the state would have to invest in children.)
Therefore the self-congratulating manner, the dreams of being once again a forerunner country seem not too well-founded. The result could easily be disappointment of the middle-class seeing that the price of tax cuts is higher payment for public services and freezed gross wages for a long period, therefore lower taxes bring not more money to spend on consumption, the disappointment of the SME-s because of the continuing lack of purchasing power, and even stronger disappointment of the poor, for whom it easily could mean more poverty and less chances to get out from their situation. The already very serious tensions can easily explode at that moment...

Welcome, Poland! - notes on exceptionalism IV.

The polish prime minister announced this day that his country approached the IMF and negotiationg on "cooperation". According to the PAP press agency the premier stressed that the move was not to get a loan, instead to have "witnesses" that Poland is capable to withstand the actual storm. Poland is not in a similar situation as other countries in the region, do not need to beg for help - said Tusk, sticking to his earlier assessment of the situation, infamously expressed at the last EU summit when he was among those heads of governemnts who were denouncing the proposals of the Hungarian prime minister regarding a regional package. Tragic and ridiculous.

Our Hero, the bycicle repairman?

The Romanian premier proudly announced yesterday that during the negotiations with the IMF the government was capable to defend both the flat tax system and its level, because, as he put it: the loan has a preventiv character and therefore the Fund set no conditions for it. (???) The latter statement is a bit confusing as according to the prime minister 2/3 of the loan will raise the reserves of the national bank while 1/3 will be used for recapitalizing banks and restart the flow of credit in the economy. This seems very similar to the case of Hungary where a part of the loan was directed to the reserves of the cantral bank (optically it raised the rate of debt/GDP ratio although at the end it is not the necessary outcome, if it will be used for replacing outgoing debt or not used up just returned to the IMF, but market "analysts" are hardly aware of this fact, only some real economists were capable to do this simple accounting task) and the IMF set conditions for the Hungarian government as well, although not specific, rather general ones. MMoreover, the IMF seems to be very "flexible" these days regarding the individual measures, for example in the Baltics they presented their proposals for Latvia, but yielded to the Latvians pressure and accepted that the country is not ready to give up the currency peg. I suppose this was the case here as well, the IMF delegation presented an overview of the situation prepared by their staff (according to the Cotidianul the IMF forecasted 4% contraction and 4,7% budget deficit) and suggested some measures. The Romanian governemnt defended the pride of the Romanian economy, the flat tax system and the low tax rates - at least in public - vehemently and prevailed.

It is quite probable that the IMF was not sticking to their own ideas as they accepted proposals of governments in other countries as well and even they are forced to accept the rapidly changing realities in ECE, making the reaching of the goals of the IMF sometimes illusory. Romania simply repeated the tactics of some Baltic states, its politicians fought for something easy to achieve to make the bitter pill a bit sweeter, and preserve national pride. We don't know of course how proud ordinary Romanians are of their tax system, but politicians are clearly obbsessed with the idea that: a, they are, b, this tax system is the primary source of the growth of the recent years.

Maybe they are right, although I would be a bit suspicious. But the real question is what kind of measures were offered and accepted by the Romanian government to comply with the conditions of the IMF, if they are not ready to raise budget revenues even if the income of the state houshold is collapsing in the recent months? (The chairman of the social democrats, the coalitional partner of Emil Boc's PDL attacked yesterday the IMF agreement and offered instead a relaxation of the budget deficit from 2% of the GDP, implicitly suggesting that the governemnt accepted keeping this rate as a goal of the agreement, leaving not much room for easing. But once again a caveat is in order. As Boc can present a success to the public it is possible that Geoana simply wants to have his own one and fights for a larger budget deficit after it was already agreed by the IMF.) The logical solution is budget cuts, but it is a problematic issue, as we could have seen in the case of Latvia as well. Unions are preparing for demonstrations even because of the cuts in the present budget that became obsolete in one month (it was accepted in February) and with further painful measures they will be even more eager to act. The coalition is not united regarding the necessity of the loan and it is another political risk. As for the economic problems, in Romania the export oriented sectors has much lower share in the GDP than in Hungary, Slovakia or in the Czech Republic and the country's growth was driven by a real estate bubble based on credit fuelled by transfers from abroad. (According to different estimates 1,5 -4 million Romanians are working abroad, mainly in country seriously affected by the crisis, like Spain, Italy.) It was similar to the Baltic case and signs of overheating were clear, therefore the task would be not only to manage the crisis but to direct the economy on another track. The government at the moment tries to launch great construction projects based on the better absorbtion of EU funds (the plans are 10bn euros for this year!) and to relaunch stalled housing projects. The proposal is simple, but doubious: local self-governments will buy those stalled projects and finish them.

It is not sure that another path, the raising of revenues would be succesfull as well. It clearly won't be benefitial for demand, although it hardly would be the main reason for the real estate market to be frozen. As the workers abroad will be affected by the crisis it will dissipate the basis of credits and consumption and it is hard to imagine the government pump enough money to the economy to substitute 7-9bn euros a year. But the real danger could be the financing of the deficit. Romanias credit ratings are in the "speculative range" and the main reason the country was not affected by this fact earlier was the massive transfer of income from abroad and the optimism about the countries future. But it is hardly a way to follow in the coming years and the government in an effort to defend higher income form higher taxation can deprive itself from budget revenues even after the crisis is over.

Shame, fear and pride - notes on exceptionalism

The Romanian president, Traian Băsescu was very active this week, adressing the parliament with a speech on the state of Romania. (Although it was an event similar to the usual State of the Nation Adress, as Băsescu's prerogatives are very limited it was rather an act of substituting the premier, Emil Boc. It is quite interesting, how the president is acting as a substitute of the prime minister, the resons behind it, but not the story I would like to deal with here.) After one or two months of contradicting scraps of news, statements on the necessity of an eventual crdit from the IMF the president announced that Romania will receive support from the international financial institutions and the EU. In hard times it is far from being surprising and perhaps as an action to contain the spreding consequences of the crisis a wise one, or at least an inevitable one. But the long story of the credit once again reveals the importance of national pride, the will of being differentiated from "others", from neighbors considered as traditional enemies.

As it is well known, two of Romania's neighbours, Hungary and Ukraine have a running agreement with the IMF, those countries are receiving financial support in the form of credit. Although Romania was considered for a while as a possible next to the line of countries applying for IMF credit it was a very delicate issue in the country. Politicians, the governor of the Romanian National Bank were either denying any overture towards the Monetary Fund or downplayed it as a condition of the EU for its own support program. There were many contradicting announcments, even Băsescu was oscillating between denial of the necessity and the acceptance of compulsion. He once even spoke of the necessity to consult the people on the IMF loan. (As if it would be time enough to make such consultations in case of necessity.) Others were spreading fairy tales that the EU has no such condition (a member of the European parliament even told the press that the EU Commission is prohibiting Romania from an agreement with IMF!) and used the opportunity for attacking the government. Quite peculiarly the chairman of the coalitional partner of Băsescu's PDL, the social democrats, is opposing the idea even at the moment, arguing that Romania needs an own "anti-crisis plan". (The government, in wich Mircea Geoana's social democrats are sitting announced its budget in February as a complete anti-crisi plan...)

Although I personally have no real emotions over IMF loans and similar agreements, even if I'm not quite convinced of the usefulness of their recipes for the respective economies, such feelings are not completely incomprehensible. But in this case the reluctance is rather a sign of the traditional enmities than the expression of real ideological convictions. (The social democrats were so eager to be a governing party that they abandoned almost every points of their election program, even those that would be advantageous for the state budget and in line with the traditional leftist perception of social justice, like the progressive tax-system.) The relationship between Ukraine and Romania is far from being relaxed, a territorial dispute was settled by the International Court in The Hague, Băsescu mentioned some territorial reorganizations in favor of Moldavia and at the expense of Ukraine and the Ukrainian nationalism, having a strong official support in the last months caused problems for the Romanian minority in Northern Bukovina. The other neighbor, Hungary is one of the traditional "others" in the Romanian identity, an arch-rival. The ever graver political chaos and the steep economic contraction in the Ukraine and the very slow economic growth in Hungary in the last few years - while Romania was treated as a new economic miracle - certainly accentuated the self-esteem of Romanian politicians. It became even more emphasized when at the end of last year the IMF and the EU considered Romania as one of the few countries predicted to have growth in 2009. Against this background the necessity to ask for an IMF loan - and to admit, that Romania has to face a grave economic situation, first of all contraction, certainly was a shock for many politicians. The IMF loan is not only the loss of sovereignty (one of the most important elements in the consciousness of the Romanian political elite in the 20th century) but the loss of the favourable position compared to the arch-rivals - the missing of the chance of overtaking them. (Although regarding Hungary it was rather illusory in the short term even one year ago.) In this sense the crisis relegates Romania to its earlier position, threatens to lose its newly acquired "Wunderkind" status and to eliminate the perceived and precious differences between the country and ECE. The fact, that it is treated as a catastrophic result clearly shows the stance of the Romanian elite towards the idea of ECE. (Băsescu promised in his speech not only a fast recovery, but the chance to get loose from the region in case of hard work.)

In Slovakia, before the gravity of the economic situation and the budget deficit was revealed, the leading newspaper, the liberal (in European sense) SME publsihd sarcastic commentaries on Hungary's premier and economic situation, while at the same time pointing out the hypocrisy of Robert Fico, the Slovak prime minister. Th surprising fact was not the negative opinion on Gyurcsány, but the scornful tone indicating a self-assured belief in the superiority in the Slovak economic reforms. Those were implied not as a possible and contradictory way of managing problems, but as the only, and self-evidently superior model, something to be followed obligatorily and at the same time conveying supriority to those who are pioneers of its case.

What about Hungary? Well, this country obviously does not belong to the region. The ridiculous story of the forint coming lose of the other ECE currencies continued to be spread, it was even mentioned as reality in the press at Wednesday. I'm not an ardent lover of the idea of national characteristic but there are obviously some people who are not happy without having the feeling that they are living in a doomed country. Moreover, the "analysts" of Raiffeisen Bank Hungary took it granted in their analysis published this week. I would say, that the usual distortion of time was somewhat reversed, and not complete history created based on ten or fifteen minutes, but ten minutes streched into a week or more, maybe into eternity. We are now living forever in that ten minutes last Wednesday....